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Introduction and summary
In the absence of a significant (and right now unfore-
seeable) shift in the retail payments landscape in the 
United States, consumers will continue to reach con-
sistently (and often) for their debit and credit cards. 
They will use these cards when paying for goods and 
services in face-to-face, Internet, mail order, and tele-
phone order transactions. Likewise, criminals will 
continue to use tried-and-true tactics and will develop 
innovative methods to perpetrate payment card fraud. 
At the intersection of consumers conducting le-
gitimate card transactions and fraudsters pursuing 
their illegal ends is a tangled web of public laws and 
private card network rules. These laws and rules allocate 
fraud risk among the consumers, card issuers, and mer-
chants participating in card-based payment systems. In 
theory, one would hope that these laws and rules for 
payment card transactions are thoughtfully designed to 
encourage behavior that minimizes fraud losses to the 
system as a whole. In reality, systemwide fraud reduction 
is often not the principal objective behind particular 
public laws or private rules affecting fraud liability allo-
cation. Consequently, these laws and rules may fail to 
promote efficient fraud avoidance; indeed, in some in-
stances, they may actually discourage fraud avoidance. 
Defining the issue
The first step in evaluating the efficiency of fraud 
liability allocation rules in current card-based payment 
systems is to define the issue. Doing so requires an 
understanding of the difference between identity theft 
and common payment card fraud, as well as an under-
standing of the workings of the card-based payment 
systems at issue. 
Identity theft versus fraud 
News stories abound about identity theft result-
ing from dumpster divers absconding with old bank 
statements and criminals rifling through mail and in-
tercepting credit card offers. Further, email accounts 
are barraged with phishing attempts and other web-
based schemes craftily designed to lure consumers 
into revealing personal identification information that 
can be used for nefarious purposes. Typically, the fraud-
sters intend to use the ill-gotten fruits of their snoop-
ing to impersonate their victims and access their credit 
or asset accounts. This is identity theft, and it is an in-
creasingly pervasive problem in the United States and 
throughout the world. During 2007, Consumer Sentinel, 
a network that collects information about consumer fraud 
and identity theft from the Federal Trade Commission 
and over 125 other organizations, recorded 258,427 
identity theft complaints.1 
Identity theft is distinguishable from common  
financial fraud. Identity theft is generally defined as 
“the use of personal identifying information to com-
mit some form of fraud.”2 In contrast, fraud is simply 
“[a] knowing misrepresentation of the truth ... to in-
duce another to act to his or her detriment.”3 As noted 
in the definition of identity theft, fraud is typically the 
end goal of identity theft. However, often fraud is 
committed without antecedent theft of Social Security 
numbers or other assumption of identity. Along with 
the cases of identity theft reported in 2007, 555,472 
cases of non-identity-theft-related fraud were reported 
during the same year. 4 Given that card-based payment 
systems (and other payment systems, for that matter) 
seek to prevent monetary fraud perpetrated through 
the system regardless of how the information used to 
perpetrate the fraud was obtained, here I focus on the 
broader category of payments fraud—whether or not 44 1Q/2009, Economic Perspectives
it is precipitated by identity theft. There is no need to 
steal another person’s identity to perpetrate simple pay-
ment card fraud—all the perpetrator needs to do is obtain 
a person’s payment card or payment card information.5 
Distinguishing fraud from identity theft is impor-
tant to the discussion that follows for two reasons. 
First, fraud is broader and more pervasive than identi-
ty theft. Second, the means of preventing fraud in the 
initiation of payments, and the appropriate allocation 
of losses that result from payments fraud, are general-
ly not dependent on whether the fraud resulted from 
identity theft or from a simpler card/data theft incident. 
There is no doubt that consumers who fall victim to 
identity theft experience significant nonmonetary losses 
in addition to the losses resulting from the fraudulent 
transactions. These include the opportunity costs of 
time spent disputing fraudulent claims, closing exist-
ing accounts, and opening new accounts.6 However, 
public laws and private rules governing card payment 
systems are not capable of preventing such costs to 
consumers because these costs are wholly external to 
the payment system itself.
Payment systems fraud generally versus signature-
based card fraud
Having distinguished identity theft from payments 
fraud and clarified that this discussion is concerned 
with the latter, it is worth making the distinction be-
tween payment systems fraud generally and payment 
systems fraud perpetrated through means of a signature-
based access device. This distinction is important be-
cause public law treats access device fraud differently 
than other types of payment systems fraud. Moreover, 
private card network rules related to fraud are gener-
ally different for signature-based card products than 
for other payment products (including card products 
based on a PIN, or personal identification number). 
For the purposes of this article, I limit my consideration 
to signature-based consumer debit cards (which are 
directly or indirectly linked to, and draw funds for 
settlement from, a consumer asset account) and credit 
cards (which are linked to, and draw funds for settle-
ment from, a line of credit extended by the card issuer). 
These types of debit and credit cards are issued for 
acceptance on the major credit card networks in the 
United States: Visa, MasterCard, American Express, 
and Discover. 
Of course, there are other payment card forms 
and other types of accounts that can be accessed using 
payment cards. These include wireless technology 
key fobs, biometric account access that uses no card 
at all, and prepaid cards that access a different type of 
account altogether. Again, I only discuss signature-based 
debit and credit cards here because these devices and 
the accounts they access remain the most prevalent in 
the retail payment systems marketplace.
Allocation of payment card fraud liability: 
Public laws and private rules
Determining which party to a given fraudulent 
payment card transaction has liability for the fraud  
requires an understanding of both the applicable public 
legal framework and the private card network rules. A 
fundamental assumption in this article (and many others, 
although the point is often unstated) is that the actual 
wrongdoer—the perpetrator of the fraud—will be un-
available for recovery, and so one of the innocent par-
ties involved in the transaction must be asked to bear 
the resulting loss. Absent any public laws or private 
rules to the contrary, the cardholder would be the risk 
bearer by default unless a benevolent merchant or card 
issuer agreed to absorb the loss. Luckily enough for 
cardholders, both public laws and private card network 
rules intervene to protect cardholders and to reallocate 
liability for fraud losses among other participants to a 
fraudulent card payment transaction. 
Public law
The public law framework that serves to protect 
consumer users of credit and debit cards from bearing 
the full brunt of fraud losses associated with lost or stolen 
access devices are as follows: the Truth in Lending 
Act (TILA), together with Regulation Z, and the 
Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), together with 
Regulation E.7 Historically, Congress has shown a 
fair degree of restraint in tinkering with TILA and the 
EFTA. Instead, Congress has allowed the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System to use its 
regulatory authority to extend appropriate consumer 
protections to new payment products and account 
structures through revisions to Regulation Z and  
Regulation E.8 
Likewise, the Federal Reserve Board generally has 
taken a measured approach in amending Regulation Z 
and Regulation E to address market developments 
(for example, transactions initiated by mobile phone) 
and new funding sources accessed by payment cards 
(for example, prepaid accounts held by the card issuer 
in an omnibus account structure).9 The Federal Reserve 
Board expressly acknowledged its restrained approach to 
expanding regulations when it promulgated the inter-
im final rule extending Regulation E coverage to pay-
roll cards, noting that the Board was not extending 
coverage more broadly to prepaid cards because 
“coverage of such products could impede the devel-
opment of other card products generally.”10 45 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z 
Under TILA and Regulation Z, cardholder liabil-
ity is capped at $50 for all unauthorized transactions, 
regardless of whether the fraud occurs in a single trans-
action or multiple transactions and regardless of when 
the cardholder learns of the loss or theft of the card or 
reports the loss or theft to the card issuer.11 The card-
holder has no liability for unauthorized activity after 
alerting the card issuer of the loss or theft of the card 
(that is, the cardholder’s liability is limited to the lesser 
of $50 or the amount of fraud committed before the 
cardholder notifies the card issuer of fraud or the loss 
or theft of the credit card).12 Regulation Z defines un-
authorized use in connection with a credit card as use 
“by a person, other than the cardholder, who does not 
have actual, implied, or apparent authority for such 
use, and from which the cardholder receives no bene-
fit.”13 Unauthorized use of a credit card includes both 
physical use of a lost or stolen card or fraudulent use 
of information from a credit card, whether or not the 
actual device has been lost or stolen.14 Thus, fraudu-
lent use of a credit card number and expiration date  
to conduct a card-not-present transaction over the  
Internet constitutes “unauthorized use” according to 
Regulation Z. 
Electronic Fund Transfer Act and Regulation E 
The EFTA and Regulation E place a floating cap 
on a consumer cardholder’s liability for unauthorized 
debit card use under which the maximum liability 
amount is determined when the cardholder notifies 
the card issuer of the loss or theft of the card used to 
perpetrate the fraud. If the cardholder notifies the card 
issuer within two business days of learning of the loss 
or theft of the debit card, the cardholder’s maximum 
liability is limited to the lesser of the actual amount 
of unauthorized transfers or $50.15 If the cardholder 
fails to notify the card issuer within two business days 
of learning of the loss or theft, the cardholder’s maxi-
mum liability is $500, of which only $50 can be attrib-
utable to fraud occurring during the first two business 
days after the cardholder learned of the loss or theft.16 
In addition, if the cardholder fails to notify the card 
issuer of unauthorized activity within 60 days after 
the card issuer sends a periodic statement reflecting 
the unauthorized transactions, subject to the $50 and 
$500 liability caps, the cardholder has unlimited lia-
bility for fraudulent transactions occurring after the 
60th day.17
It is worth noting that negligence of the card-
holder in safeguarding the debit card is not a basis for 
the card issuer to impose greater liability on the card-
holder than is otherwise permissible under the EFTA/
Regulation E.18 Regulation E defines an unauthorized 
electronic funds transfer as a transfer “initiated by a 
person other than the consumer without actual authori-
ty to initiate the transfer and from which the consum-
er receives no benefit.”19 Unauthorized use under 
Regulation E includes fraudulent use of information 
from a debit card, including card number and expira-
tion date, to initiate an electronic funds transfer.
Card network fraud liability rules 
TILA/Regulation Z and the EFTA/Regulation E 
set a baseline maximum of consumer cardholder lia-
bility for fraudulent transactions conducted using a 
credit card or debit card.20 The effect of this public 
law regime is to require the card issuer to absorb all 
fraud liability in excess of the maximum cardholder 
liability allowed under law. Given the stated purposes 
of TILA/Regulation Z and the EFTA/Regulation E—
to protect consumers—it is not surprising that these 
laws are not concerned with further allocation of fraud 
liability after shifting responsibility from the cardholder 
to the card issuer.21 The card network rules both en-
hance the baseline cardholder protections established 
by TILA/Regulation Z and by the EFTA/Regulation E 
and further allocate fraud liability from card issuers 
to merchants based on a complicated set of rules that 
vary based on the type of transaction at issue. The card 
networks enhance the cardholder protections offered 
under TILA/Regulation Z and the EFTA/Regulation E 
through their “zero liability policies.”22 The card net-
works allocate fraud liability risk between card issuers 
and merchants based upon detailed dispute resolution 
rules, which take into account at least some element 
of the respective parties’ compliance with network 
rules designed to detect and deter attempted fraudu-
lent transactions. 
Whether the card issuer or the merchant to a par-
ticular fraudulent transaction ultimately will be liable 
for the fraud losses depends on if the merchant followed 
the payment card rules in connection with the particu-
lar transaction. There are numerous permutations of 
rule requirements for all manner of transaction types. 
One of the most significant determinants of whether 
the card issuer or the merchant in a particular transac-
tion will be responsible for fraud is whether the trans-
action is a face-to-face transaction (a “card-present 
transaction”) or a transaction conducted over the  
Internet, by mail, or by telephone (a “card-not-present 
transaction”). 
If one distills the standard requirements across 
the card networks to their essence, it is generally true 
that a merchant engaging in a card-not-present trans-
action may only successfully overcome a cardholder/
card issuer allegation that the transaction was the re-
sult of fraud if the merchant 1) performed an address 46 1Q/2009, Economic Perspectives
verification at the time the transaction was authorized 
(that is, verified that the person conducting the trans-
action could validate the billing address associated 
with the payment card being used); 2) delivered the 
purchased merchandise to an address that matches the 
address validated through the address verification; 
and 3) obtained proof that the purchased goods were 
delivered to the verified address. If the merchant can-
not satisfy these requirements, the card network rules 
typically shift fraud liability from the card issuer to 
the merchant. Contrast this to the card-present trans-
action environment, where a merchant may success-
fully defend a transaction disputed by the cardholder 
or card issuer as fraudulent by demonstrating that the 
card was present at the point of sale and by producing 
a signed transaction receipt. In the event of such a 
successful defense, the card issuer typically will be 
held accountable for the fraud losses. 
Do current fraud liability allocation rules 
create incentives that minimize systemwide 
fraud losses?
A shorthand way to look at default liability allo-
cation under public law and private rules of the pay-
ment card schemes is as follows: 1) Consumers rarely 
bear meaningful liability for fraudulent transactions 
unless they benefited from the fraud; 2) issuers typi-
cally bear liability for fraud losses perpetrated in card-
present transactions; and 3) merchants generally bear 
liability for fraud losses perpetrated in card-not-present 
transactions. Taking a systemwide approach to fraud 
in card-based payment systems, the natural question 
that follows from the current status quo is whether the 
rules for fraud liability allocation result in efficient out-
comes: That is, are the parties to each payment card 
transaction vested with appropriate incentives in the 
form of fraud liability risk to encourage each to take 
reasonable steps to minimize fraud losses viewed from 
the perspective of the payment system as a whole? 
Cardholder liability for fraudulent transactions
There is little doubt that cardholders’ careless-
ness in protecting their own card information contrib-
utes to the incidence of payment card fraud. A recent 
study commissioned by Canada’s Interac Association 
found that 60 percent of Canadians do not shield their 
PIN entry at automated teller machines (ATMs) or 
point-of-sale terminals when they believe no one is 
watching them and that 37 percent do not shield their 
PIN entry even when they believe someone can see 
them entering it.23 The extent to which cardholders 
are regularly negligent in protecting their own card 
information from potential fraudsters is debatable. On 
the one hand, cardholders surely do not wish to invite 
fraud. On the other hand, while cardholders may not 
be aware of the nuanced differences in fraud liability 
protections available under public laws and private 
rules,24 it would be difficult for cardholders not to be 
aware of their protections under the zero liability pol-
icies prominently and repeatedly promoted by the 
card networks.25
Assuming most consumers understand, at least  
in some abstract sense, that they are protected from 
liability for fraud losses regardless of their level of 
diligence in safeguarding their own information, one 
wonders whether a greater deductible on the first-dollar 
insurance coverage mandated by the card networks 
through zero liability policies would reduce the inci-
dence of fraud by encouraging appropriate risk-avoiding 
behavior.26 As it currently stands, the major card net-
works’ zero liability policies (and even the very low 
deductibles payable by cardholders under public law) 
leave in place a significant risk of moral hazard27 that 
almost certainly, at least at the margins, contributes to 
overall systemwide fraud losses. 
Notwithstanding what appears to be somewhat 
low-hanging fruit in the effort to achieve systemwide 
fraud reduction, there are two significant challenges—
both likely insurmountable—that make increasing 
cardholder liability highly unlikely regardless of the 
efficiency in the outcome it may engender. The first 
challenge is the increasing trend among legislators 
and regulators to enact payment-system-related pub-
lic laws that offer greater consumer protection regard-
less of the efficiency of the fraud-related outcomes 
these laws may create.28 A reversal of this trend 
among legislators, in particular, is unlikely given in-
creased public attention on consumer protections in 
payment systems. 
The second challenge is the need, critical to broad-
based user adoption and acceptance of any payment 
system, for the users to have confidence in the system’s 
security and safety. Card network operators are con-
stantly searching for ways to induce greater cardholder 
confidence in the security of making card-based  
payments—which they hope will result in a correla-
tive increase in transaction volume across the payment 
system.29 Designing a card-based payment system 
that increases consumer liability for fraudulent trans-
actions would likely undermine confidence in the  
system overall and result in reduced transaction vol-
ume—the opposite of the desired effect. Given these 
counterincentives among those who promulgate the 
applicable public laws and private rules, increased 
cardholder liability is likely not a viable option for 
improving the overall efficiency of fraud liability  
allocation rules. 47 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Liability for fraudulent transactions:  
Card issuer versus merchant
If increasing cardholder liability is an improbable 
outcome of any fraud-reducing reforms to card pay-
ment systems at the level of either public law or private 
rules, then we are left to consider whether adjustments 
to the allocation of fraud liability between card issuers 
and merchants under current card network rules might 
have a desirable effect in reducing systemwide fraud 
losses. As described previously, the card issuers gen-
erally bear fraud liability in card-present transactions 
and merchants generally bear fraud liability in card-
not-present transactions. 
In the card-present context, existing card network 
rules may provide inadequate incentives for merchants 
to take efforts to detect and deter fraudulent transac-
tions. Generally, so long as the presented card is swiped 
through the point-of-sale terminal and a signature is 
obtained on the transaction receipt, the merchant will 
not bear the loss if the transaction is subsequently 
challenged as fraudulent. Consequently, the marginal 
economic benefit to merchants of deploying additional 
fraud prevention measures, even if effective measures 
are made available by card issuers and card networks, 
may well not justify the costs to the merchant of im-
plementation because the merchant stands to gain little. 
Fraud detection measures in traditional brick-and-
mortar sales channels today include the examination 
of the card for evidence of tampering and a compari-
son of the signature on the transaction receipt to the 
signature on the back of the card (although many 
merchants’ employees do not even glance at the card 
presented for payment). 
In contrast, in the card-not-present environment, 
existing card network rules may create disincentives 
for card issuers to support and induce their cardhold-
ers to participate in fraud prevention efforts. Nowhere 
is this more evident than in the surprisingly low adop-
tion of card networks’ payer authentication programs.30 
Visa and MasterCard have each developed and actively 
promoted services designed to assist Internet merchants 
in authenticating payers—for Visa the Verified by 
Visa program and for MasterCard the MasterCard  
SecureCode program. Under both programs, a pre- 
enrolled cardholder conducting a card-not-present 
transaction at a participating merchant is asked to 
provide an authenticating password in a secure pop-
up window or frame linked to the card issuer.31 The 
pop-up window or frame in which the cardholder is 
asked to provide the password displays a phrase or image 
preselected by the cardholder so that the cardholder 
can validate that the pop-up or frame is linked to the 
card issuer.32 This bidirectional layer of additional authen-
tication not only deters fraud, but card network rules 
provide that it also shifts fraud liability risk from the mer-
chant to the card issuer for the verified transaction. 
One might think merchants would eagerly adopt 
these additional security measures and embrace the 
attendant liability shift to the card issuer for Internet 
transactions. However, online merchants that have  
attempted to require customers to enroll in such pro-
grams have invoked the ire of their customers. Card 
issuers have little incentive to expend resources or 
risk cardholder backlash by requiring participation  
in such programs given that the benefit would accrue 
primarily to the merchant, with the added offense of 
shifting transaction fraud liability to the issuer.33 In 
other words, card network rules appear to create the 
same dilemma of moral hazard in allocating fraud 
losses between card issuers and merchants in both 
card-not-present and card-present transactions as is 
created by public laws and private rules that insulate 
cardholders from fraud liability. 
Conclusion
Empirical evaluation suggests that current public 
law regimes and private card network rules may fail 
to create appropriate incentives for cardholders, mer-
chants (in card-present transactions), and card issuers 
(in card-not-present transactions) to adopt fraud-reduc-
ing practices. These rules may also discourage fraud-
avoiding behavior in certain circumstances because 
of the associated costs and efforts involved and the 
limited benefit to be gained by the party undertaking 
those costs and efforts. This is not to say the current 
architecture of public laws and private rules is funda-
mentally flawed or in need of reworking from the 
ground up. As Robert Ballen and Thomas Fox have 
argued, the current system in which public law and 
private rulemaking collaborate to create fraud liability 
rules is capable of functioning effectively to achieve 
efficiency in payment systems.34 However, it may be 
time to reevaluate the incentives created by current 
card network rules in allocating fraud liability among 
transaction participants to better align risks with the 
parties that are able to make efficient decisions re-
garding how to mitigate them. Increasing cardholder 
liability is likely not on the table for consideration, 
but efficiency gains in terms of reduced systemwide 
fraud losses may well be possible through relatively 
minor adjustments to the allocation of liability be-
tween merchants and card issuers. 48 1Q/2009, Economic Perspectives
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